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Abstract: This article is aimed at providing a thorough analysis about the way in which China 
constructs an impersonation of its presence in Southeast Asian affairs. The Southeast Asian region is 
particularly important for Chinese foreign policy, as it was usually portrayed of being adjacent to 
Chinese backyard-type of influence.  With the same task of character and of function, China was able 
to maintain a specific closeness to Southeast Asian affairs, much like in the way it was able to do to 
the Northeast Asian affairs – the sub-region to which it forebode an act of belonging.  The incipit 
part of the article is directed to pinpointing the glaring contemporary effect of Southeast Asian Affairs 
in Security Studies. We will be reffering here to the arguments tapped into, that make the region a 
focus of attention, from the perspective of economic development, and also from the perspective of 
strategic bearing. The last and the most turgid part of the article is directed to the desultory portraiture 
of China`s presence in Southeast Asian affairs. A historic overture will be in-played by the arguments 
presented, as well as security ratiocinations regarding the posture, that China understands to insert in 
the bi- and multilateral frameworks of engagement with the regional actors. 
Keywords: Southeast Asian Affairs; Security Studies; Role-Playing; Auto-Conceived Role; Middle 
Kingdom  
 
1. Southeast Asian Affairs – The Glaring Contemporary Effect in 
Security Studies 
The Southeast Asian region has almost always been interstitial for regional 
security studies. The Southeast Asian region has never been the site of particular 
research interests, especially in the past century. References about Southeast Asia 
have always been very thoughtful to the studying of other Asian analytical 
inquests.  
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The research conducted on Southeast Asia, especially during the past century, has 
been prodding and revealing other in-using analysis. Southeast Asia was not 
singularly searched upon as a region, but with couplets and dyads of examination
1
.  
References of Southeast Asia were usually made in a twosome pitch: Chinese, 
Indian or Japanese politics on Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian politics in China, 
India, Japan were somewhat lower-skilled on analytical partners. Even the 
academic research did not consider the subject as a self-governing likelihood in 
regional studies.  
The 20
th
 century history of Southeast Asia has been quite eventful, self-reliant in 
quantity and rate of variation. Of course, a white-collar reviewing
2
 of the region 
mattered, as long as the extra-regional influences in the region were tempered 
intensely. 
It could have been that the research class word-widely was very conservative, even 
to the point, externally-induced, that grass-roots initiation of regional orders
3
 and 
autonomous regional management in Southeast Asia did not prove proportionate 
sufficiency in order to be studied as such, and in the refactoring of extra-regional 
foreign policies in Southeast Asia.  
To the end of the 20
th
 century, the study of Southeast Asia has been dilated as a 
point of interest in international research. The revivification of interest came from 
the fact that the economic growth rhythms have been positive, despite the 
economic meltdown of the Asian Financial Crisis
4
.  
                                                     
1 Usually, Southeast Asia was a parallel axis of investigation, acting along the lines of the 
researchers` mindedness for the Asian continent at large. 
2 We utilized the term - white-collar reviewing - with the meaning of  first-class and first-rate-
reviewing of the region;  
3 We utilized here this term – regional order - with the meaning of regional customary ways of 
operation that produce a legal and constraining design in which the regional actors can exchange 
interactions, under the advisement that in these interactions they will resort to a conduct rule-based 
and rule-conformed. 
4 Until the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, Southeast Asia hosted countries that were regional 
specimens of what was described to be: The Asian Miracle – an expression utilized to describe the 
way in which certain Asian economies, achieved the status of being affluent economies in world 
economics, by experiencing manifold increases in their per capita income and technological complex 
headway. 
In Southeast Asia, especially Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia were fitted in the pattern 
of the Asian Miracle for having applied export-led strategies with the tenets of corporate 
management for instrumental purposes. The Asian Financial Crisis proved that their strategy did not 
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This revivification was also set ahead by the fact that regional ware of security 
utilities, embodied by ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
successfully transmuted the Cold War period, not only presenting actuality in the 
post-Cold War period, but also presenting continuance, a continuance that leaped 
and bounded from the poll of accord and unanimity of its member states. No matter 
how hard one can try to find a common progenitor, that was an underlying motive 
in the formation of ASEAN, it is very hard to find one.  
In Southeast Asia, no common language, no common administrative system, no 
common political regime, no common religion, no common resemblance in 
political structures, no analogy in the measurement of the performance of the 
political domestic structures, no common economic decrement trends, no common 
ontogenetic means and instruments of statecraft – are causes enough for 
connectedness in unity and harmony. Such arrant diversity has been the cause of 
many inter-state temperance during Southeast Asian history.  
With diversity so thoroughgoing in the hearts and minds of the Southeast Asian 
people and of the political elites, it was very hard for a succession of according to 
be produced and actually exert strength and faculties of unanimity. 
The regional states had to find a common descriptor that would best underwrite the 
source of common interests, in way that would not make their participation into 
such a venture unskillful. We could not disregard the fact that the amount of 
motion along this direction has been phenomenal.  
As we mentioned above, Southeast Asian studies have been a suburban frontier of 
area studies. One of the reasons for this consideration is the fact that Southeast 
Asian studies were considered too context-dependent participles.  
This dependence on context was also due to the extra-regional involvement in the 
region:  at first, during the Cold War, the bi-polar anchor-casters
1
 impeded the 
theoretical sophistication that Southeast Asia could have gained and then, in the 
post- Cold War Era, American uni-polar involvement
2
 in the developing world. 
                                                                                                                                       
present an honest measurement of the status of their domestic economies and the fact that they were 
unprepared to face the unpredictability and unfamiliarity of true economic globalization. 
1 This term – bi-polar anchor-casters – was used within an indirect testimonial of the bi-polar 
antagonist competition for world dominance between US and the Soviet Union. 
2 With reference to the uni-polar moment celebrated by the US as the winning camp of the Cold War. 
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 These factors held back the disciplinary specialization of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Nowadays, the causal agency for the new-empowered emanation of Southeast 
Asian Studies and for the global focus on Southeast Asia can be explained through 
a double impairment of factors: regional and extra-regional
1
.  
Regionally speaking, according to the estimates released by the OECD, Southeast 
Asia will experience a growth of 5.5% over the next five years
2
. These estimations 
mean that Southeast Asian economy will return to the levels of development that 
Southeast Asia had before the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998
3
.  
It appears that the investments made in science and education, in the health system 
and in the remuneration system have yielded profit. 
 More than that, the regional states` ambition to align regional standards to 
international standards, through the creation of an ASEAN Community, based on 
three pillars: ASEAN Political Security Community, ASEAN Economic 
Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, has, indeed paid off. From 
an extra-regional standpoint, the regional – by the offices of ASEAN – has been 
plastering external relations with important extra-regional actors: China, US, EU 
standing on the empyrean.  
With the resurged attention that these actors have been giving the region, 
Southeast Asia has taken seizure of the world`s vigilance. This combined with the 
important geostrategic position of Southeast Asia- being located at the overlap 
road between the most important maritime lanes in world sea-fare and at the 
interweaving of the communication passageways between important hot spots
4
 - 
make the casting of plenty of limelight upon the region a natural fact. 
                                                     
1 In this way, the symmetry with the binomial nomenclature of the thesis – the regional/extra-
regional variables was ensured. 
2 The data was contrived from the OECD Southeast Asian Economic Outlook 2013 – with 
perspectives on China and India (Executive Summary), electronic documentation in informatics 
system, made by accessing: http://www.oecd.org/dev/asiaandpacific/SAEO2013%20E-
Executive%20summary.pdf, date of accession: 24th of November 2013, accession time: 14:56 p.m. 
3 According to the UK Guardian, electronic documentation in informatics system, made by accessing: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/datablog/2012/nov/18/oecd-south-East-asia-
economic-outlook#data, date of accession: 24th of November 2013, accession time: 12:23 p.m. 
4 With reference to the communication passageways between Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 
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2. China`s Auto-conceived Role in Southeast Asian Affairs 
When considering China`s role in global affairs, we are usually stuck with a sense 
of consternation: How do we China`s strategic potential globally? How is this 
potential circumvented regionally, especially in Southeast Asia?  How much is 
China`s reluctance to engage in some areas of the Southeast Asian regional affairs 
a possibility of incurring loss and misfortune for ASEAN, in general, and for every 
Southeast Asian state, in particular? Is China`s potential of making mischiefs 
scary or just a sign of loss of maturity?  
Answers to such questions cannot be properly occupied in an agreeable fashion by 
the presentation of Chinese role in Southeast Asian affairs. Yet, this could become 
a very interesting analytical point of departing further evaluations. 
Compared to other regions in the world, for Southeast Asia, China has always 
been there!
1
 Even from the times of Imperial China, based on the tributary 
relations between China and the Southeast Asian states, China regarded 
Southeast Asia as a place of special sensitivity where norms, beliefs and values are 
shared among the different actors of the region.  
Tributary relations were part of the sino-centric vision upon the world and 
represented for the regional states a first indication of the concept of the regional 
order. In a way, China was fulfilling a special mission of socializing/sinicizing the 
states close to its periphery. China was the Middle Kingdom, a kingdom 
surrounded from four cardinal points by people on a smaller pedestal as far as 
culture and civilization was concerned.  
It was China`s duty to protect those people and to integrate them into the 
boundaries of its civilization and culture. Ideas and conceptions were the master 
                                                     
1 According to the scholar Fairbank John, there are three areas that characterize China`s relations with 
the rest of the world: The Sinic Zone – which includes the peoples and the countries closest to China`s 
geographical premises like Vietnam (mainland Southeast Asia) and North Koreea. The Inner Asia 
Zone – which includes the non-Chinese people whose territorial cultural areas are very close to 
China`s cultural area, in terms of geographical proximity, and the Outer Zone – which includes the 
nations and people that nurture an attachment to China and are willing to keep close contacts with 
China, but, at the same time, that are separated by waters and land from the Chinese territory – in this 
category, the states of maritime Southeast Asia are the most likely to be included. The references to 
John Fairbank‟s work have been made by: Mondejar Reuben and Chu Lung Wai – ASEAN-China 
Relations: Legacies and Future Directions, in: Leong Khai Ho, C.Y. Ku Samuel (edt.)(2005), China 
and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore. 
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builders of China`s role in regional and global affairs. The majority of these ideas 
were effectuated, with harmony restoration in mind
1
.  
Imperial rulers take on battles to preserve the purity of the Chinese cultural area – 
that was represented by the central area of the Chinese Empire. It was there that all 
Chinese power came from. The peripheries were not considered sources of power, 
of culture of civilization.  
Once taken into the Chinese cultural area, there was no independent life allowed 
for the elements situated in the periphery of the Chinese Empire. The Imperial 
order was emancipated on two important concepts: de
2
 and dao
3
. One of the most 
important principles of global order was the lesser value attributed to legalism. 
The legalist doctrine – of enforcing and putting into effect legal norms and rules – 
was given a lower status in the imperial view on the world order, as it was seen as a 
mechanical artifact, whose use was improper in Imperial China and in its 
peripheries.  
To blame was the fact that imperial rulers saw legalism as improper and 
impersonal. China and Southeast Asia did not use jointly the same principles of 
                                                     
1 When harmony and balance were spoiled, political order had to be rectified from the top and the 
spoilers had to be eliminated. The restoration of balance and harmony was a moral mission of those 
who were located in the highest ranks of the  political hierarchy.  The same rules applied for inter-
state relations: hierarchy in inter-state relations was to be accepted like some sort of a datum. It was 
the preoccupation for the one that was situated on a smaller ladder that drove the missions of 
restoration in Southeast Asia. The missions of restoration – or warfare– were presented like missions 
of eliberation from perpetual chaos; Only in this way were these missions allowed, even if the 
arrogation of order restoration was frequent; These ideas of world order – which were also applied to 
the regional order for the vassal Southeast Asian states – had a deep Confucian root. Confucius urged 
for a moral conduct in political leadership and management. Confucius saw the flattening of 
hierarchies as something very malign for society, in narrow and broad terms; Confucius thought that 
hierarchies had to be respected as much as possible. The disrespect for hierarchies was the major 
source for conflict and for chaos to emerge; Of course, the Chinese political leaders saw that 
alterations of the Confucian principles were in order for the purposes of transferring Chinese ideas 
into the tributary states. The transfer of Chinese ideas into the tributary states happened usually by 
war – a behavior that Confucianism did not approve or condone. Also, streamlining the Confucian 
way of thinking, a leader must represent an inspiration, that can usually be achieved, by observational 
learning. But, in the Confucianist view, a leader must possess in-born qualities to be that inspiration 
and must treat his subjects with kindliness and in a good-natured way; Confucianism did not 
encourage the expansionism of the Chinese Imperial Era; Confucianist ideas were truncated and 
interpreted by false mutilation and addition. However, the settled determination of the Chinese 
imperial leaders was careful to pick on the elements needed to build the exceptionalist view upon the 
world of the Chinese Imperial Era. 
2De – meaning virtous power. 
3Dao – meaning natural order. 
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governship, nor the same political philosophy. Southeast Asian kingdoms were 
based on the mandala system of state-craft. Power centralization was not that 
important for the Southeast Asian states, as it was for Imperial China.  
The mandala system did not awaken in the Southeast Asian kingdoms an 
assiduous striving to control the peripheries, or to specifically define the 
peripheries. The Southeast Asian kingdoms were mounted together by the easiness 
of state-description. Territorial boundaries were not drawn by the Southeast Asian 
rulers, as they did not have the power to sanction their bending by other kingdoms 
or empires. 
One can imagine the mandala system - as a dense crowd of concentric circles one 
contained in the inner edge of the other – with no enclosed link to circle standing in 
the center. Despite the fragmentation of the political power of the Southeast Asian 
kingdoms, they had an inner desire to manipulate resources, at their own liking and 
to gather as many resources as possible to make the vaning of power a distant 
prospect.  
As compared to Imperial China, the Southeast Asian states 
1
seemed not interested 
in the continuance of power holding. According to Indian precepts (with a double 
lineage – Buddhist and Hindu), those who held power, would only exercise it in a 
limited, temporary fashion. 
 Power was not a grant by Divinity that had to be cherished as a life-long 
possession. In this respect, the Southeast Asian states were more flexible towards 
the constancy of leaders in their political life. In general, laxity was an important 
characteristic of the Southeast Asian states. This tells a lot of the structure of 
expectations of the extra-regional actors the Southeast Asian states interacted with.  
When Imperial China talked about the spiritual fulfillment that the tributary 
relations would bring to the Southeast Asian kingdoms, the Southeast Asian states 
believed that power and the political configurations, from which power evolved, 
                                                     
1 We will be using the association of terms: Southeast Asian states, not in the modern way, but to 
show the fact that the different tributary missions that Imperial China financed in the region that 
today has come to be known as Southeast Asia, found some sort of political organizations, in which 
leadership was fully translated into a structured design. These form of political organization, in order 
to survive, accepted the conditions imposed by Imperial China; The Chinese rulers exposed concern 
and solicitude in interacting closely with the leaders of the Southeast Asian kingdoms; Usually, the 
tributary missions were sent to the Chinese Emperor. They would be received as a sign of undue 
respect from the sender`s side; Only the Vietnamese rulers, out of all the Southeast Asian states, chose 
and were accepted to pay tribute personally to the Chinese Emperor. 
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were dependent on karma. Before reaching the karmic point, power had a life-
cycle of its own on Earth. Karma gave the lack of regularity of the exercise of 
power. This is why, for the Southeast Asian kingdoms, provisional power was a 
relief while permanent power was an abstract manufacturing.  
The Chinese Emperor represented a colligation between the celestial power and the 
Earth. The Chinese Emperor reigned, by will of Divinity and with a mandate 
endorsed by Heaven.  The person of the Chinese Emperor had an exceptional aura 
upon him, as he could have made settlements and verdicts on Earth that would 
reconstitute order, without fear of being wrong. If he failed and other dynasties 
succeeded, then, this meant that the Chinese Emperor had lost the divine mandate 
to rule, so another person had to take on the job of ruling and replace him.  
Curiously, the Southeast Asian kingdoms had, in comparison with the Chinese 
view upon statecraft, a more secular approach, although not less spiritual. It was, as 
a matter of fact, a view that was not so devotional to Divine observances. The 
Southeast Asian kingdoms professed a policy of adaptation and accommodation 
towards the Chinese worldview, given the high esteem of tolerance and acceptance 
their political culture took on. Specificities of their own political culture remained, 
whether the contacts with Imperial China were ablazed or infrequent. The end of 
Imperial China in 1911
1
 did not mean that the old, Sino-centric view upon the 
world died also.  
If, during the days of Imperial China, China saw itself as stellar in the inter-state 
relations taking place on the Asian continent, the same idea of centricity in Asia 
was propelled by China`s further actions.  
After 1911, China underwent many years of domestic upheaval, culminating with 
the collapse of the Nationalist government and the establishment of Communist 
rule. Revolutionary China did not find easy to adapt to a hostile environment for 
Sino-centricity. 
China was no longer the Center of the World –as professed by the Chinese 
ancestors of the Communist leaders. China became
2
 an isolated country regionally 
and globally. The Communist leaders had to reinvent a role for China. 
Its forking had to be consistent world-widely and regionally. The past, even if 
rejected for its mistakes, could still offer universally acceptable lessons. The 
                                                     
1 When the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty took place. 
2 Even if only for a short period. 
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Communist leaders itemized the idea of harmony and harmony protection as a 
midpoint on which to build on the role that Communist China would play in world 
and regional affairs.  
The Communist leaders understood that time was a unifying factor and the only 
safe term of reference for the interpretation of a country`s destiny
1
. This time, in 
the international system, there was not only one China. There were two Chinas.  
There was a lot of conjecture and surmise regarding China`s new status in the 
international system
2
. The past was perfect for conferring to the newly founded 
People`s Republic of China a softer outlook. The role conceived by the national 
elites was the role of peacefully co-existing with the other nations
3
. 
It was a new recipe of five principles: mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These 
principles were enunciated in 1954. 
On their bedrock, Communist China was determined to lose the choosy character 
that was prevalent in the foreign policy of Communist China and to develop a 
more commodious diplomacy. China stood firm in stating that there were no states 
with which China did not want to interact. China was open to interactions that did 
not infringe the five principles or its sovereignty.  
The new foreign policy emphasized the importance of communitarianism, 
following the great Confucianist tradition: “At no time and in no circumstances 
should a Communist place his personal interests first; he should subordinate them 
to the interests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, 
corruption, seeking the limelight, and so on, are most contemptible, while 
                                                     
1 It was not the imperial approach to time and history that the rulers of Imperial China had – in which 
there were components of time`s immovable eternity in the power that concentrated in their hands; 
Time was understood in the present and the idea of harmony was linked to the present time. 
2  Between 1945-1971, China lost the United Nations` membership. 
3 „This principle was expounded in the common Programme adopted by the First Session of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on 29 September, 
1949 as well as in the Announcement of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China 
made by Chairman Mao Zedong at the proclamation Ceremony Marking the Founding of the People's 
Republic of China. It embodied the major content of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” - 
electronic documentation in informatic system, made by accessing: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm, date of accession: 19th of November 
2013, accession time: 17:29 p.m. 
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selflessness, working with all one‟s energy, whole-hearted devotion to public duty, 
and quiet hard work will command respect”1. (Mao, 1938) 
The new security concepts included implementing communitarianism and 
cohesiveness in the domestic public life and a conciliatory, placid approach in 
foreign affairs. Concomitantly, China supported revolutionary warfare and 
Communist insurgencies in its backyard: Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia and 
Northeast Asia appealed to China`s deputation of exporting the products of its 
Cultural Revolution, beginning with its strategic neighbourhood.  
Under the SEATO aegis - that was founded in 1966 – was created to foil the 
spillover of the Communist insurgencies from China to Southeast Asia. Before 
that, in 1962, US and its allies concocted Plan 4 – a secret plan meant to protect 
Southeast Asia against a Chinese military invasion that was thought to be nearing. 
 It was a plan that entailed the use of nuclear weapons to protect Southeast Asia 
from becoming a region with a semi-colonial status towards the Chinese. Some 
signs of worry were already there: in 1945, after Ho Chi Minh declared the birth of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Indochina became a theatre of military 
operations in which guerilla warfare and Communist insurgencies preponderated; 
in 1948, Communist insurgency broke out in Malaya, while in 1948, the Malayan 
Secret Service denude the Communist insurgency`s plans for revolt; Indonesia, 
from the mere start, declared a zero-tolerance policy towards the Communists. 
Communism was feared of because of its unsteady effects upon the regional 
security environment.  China was blowing a Cultural wind of change in Southeast 
Asia, something that could not have impelled passivity from the Southeast Asian 
states.  
By redefining its role, China sought major changes in the security environment of 
the approximate regions. China was not that keen on practicing role-adaptation, 
but was rather willing to adapt the proximate, regional security environments to its 
own role. In this period, China played a double role in foreign policy: the role of 
peaceful actor and the role of Communist growth-ranker. 
                                                     
1Electronic documentation in informatic system, made by accessing: 
http://afe.EASia.columbia.edu/ps/China/mao_being_Communist.pdf, date of accession: 18th of 
October 2013, accession time: 18:06 p.m.; These ideas refer to the individual sacrifice for the public 
good and well-being, ideas whose proponents include the pillars that Confucius` communitarianism 
had stood for. 
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 Attention was drawn to the excesses China made for the accomplishment of its 
goal-setting. An important turn for China was the defeat of the Gang of Four by 
the group coordinated by Deng Xiaoping and the entering of China in a new era of 
development and innovation from 1977.  
China would no longer make investments with unspoken encouragement for the 
support of the Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. China`s approach in 
regional affairs would be more pragmatic, than ideological. Confidence in Marxism 
was no longer wholly implemented, as China envisioned a transformation from 
within in a more hard-headed and knowing manner.  
China`s role could not bifurcate from the socialist path, but with the task of 
solving China`s domestic structural problems in: agriculture, industry, national 
defense, science and technology
1
. In foreign policy, China would preserve the 
same peaceful tenure.  
In 1998, one of the most originative changes occurred in China`s security strategy.  
In the document released in 1998, which was entitled: China`s  Defence – the 
Chinese strategic planners envisioned a concept of security that would interrelate 
China`s concerns for military modernization, as well as for economic security and 
for the peaceful coexistence: “Security cannot be guaranteed by an increase in 
arms, or by military alliances. Security should be based on mutual trust and 
common interests.  We should promote trust through dialogue, seek security 
through cooperation, respect each other‟s sovereignty, solve disputes through 
peaceful means and strive for common development”2. The principle inferred was: 
quan mian hua – the principle of comprehensive security.  
China never renounced to its positive rethoric of peacefulness, that accompanied 
Chinese foreign policy makers ever since the first generation of Chinese 
Communists. In the post-Cold War Era China`s ideational discourse tried to find 
new means through which China`s national role could be further globalized. 
China was preparing itself for not following in the footsteps of USSR. In the 
domestic elites` consideration, USSR failed at understanding the complex series of 
forces that were shaping the international security environment, by not paying 
enough attention to the influence that economic performance can have upon 
security.  
                                                     
1 These areas were part of Deng Xiaoping`s Four Modernizations Programme. 
2Defence White Paper 1998, Ministry of National Defense, People`s Republic of China, 1998. 
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The Chinese foreign policy-makers were discontent with the unipolar moment that 
US was enjoying in the post-Cold War Era. China was trying to make its strategic 
relevance visible, by a non-hawkish, less provocative discourse in foreign affairs, a 
relevance that would allow it to combine a peaceful security role in: economic, 
traditional, transnational security challenges (such as terrorism) as well as in non-
traditional security
1
.  
In the National Defense White Paper of 2002, China unwaveringly kept the five 
principles of peaceful co-existence
2
. A special place in the chapter reserved for the 
regional security cooperation was dedicated to the extended region of Asia-Pacific.  
The White Paper of 2002 showed that China was ready to assume more 
responsibilities in the region: “Conducting dialogue and cooperation with Asia-
Pacific countries is an important content of China‟s policy concerning Asia-Pacific 
security, and a component part of its policy of good-neighborliness and 
friendship. China persists in building a good-neighborly relationship and 
partnership with its neighbors and strengthens regional cooperation constantly”3. 
Even if the White Paper presents a Chinese commitment for the non-use of nuclear 
weapons
4
, China still did not ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
5
. 
China also applauded the success ASEAN has made in creating a peaceful security 
environment for Southeast Asia: „The cooperation in East Asia with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea (10 + 3) as the major channel, has become more practical. 
                                                     
1 It was a new stance in foreign policy after the Western condemnation of the brutal suppression of 
protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Despite these disapprobations, China insisted that its human-
right record is not untarnished, but under reform; The New Security Concept of 1997 was meant to 
show the world that reasons for adjudging China as antagonist or a juggernaut of international norms 
was unfair. 
2 It is striking how these principles served as landmarks of continuity for China`s national auto-
conceived role. 
3Defence White Paper (2002), Ministry of National Defence, People`s Republic of China, 2002. 
4 An important specification for the Southeast Asian states was that: „China has consistently 
advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. On the very first 
day it came into possession of nuclear weapons, China solemnly declared that at no time and under no 
circumstances would it be the first to use such weapons. Later, China undertook unconditionally not 
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free 
zones, and has consistently urged all nuclear-weapon states to enshrine these commitments in a legal 
form”, according to: Defence White Paper (2002), Ministry of National Defence, People`s Republic 
of China, 2002” – an implicit engagement to respect the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons` Free 
Zone. 
5 On the other hand, China is signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
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China and ASEAN have reached a consensus on the establishment of a free trade 
area within 10 years, initiating full cooperation in the field of non-traditional 
security issues”1. China affirmed an adherence to the ARF method of conflict-
resolution through dialogue. 
Stepping on to more enhanced security accountableness, China`s answerableness 
to the complexities of its regional role can be examined in the National Defense 
White Paper – China`s National Defense in 2010. Released in 2011, China`s 
regional and global role is described as defensive in nature, even if the security 
challenges that China has to pay attention to, have boosted in number.  
China`s role in security affairs would be to protect and shield from any obstruction 
China`s national security, to be able keep in the same status of preservation the 
domestic and regional security stability and harmony and to held itself as a non-
belligerent country, while accomplishing these objectives: “China pursues a 
national defense policy which is defensive in nature. In accordance with the 
Constitution of the People's Republic of China and other relevant laws, the armed 
forces of China undertake the sacred duty of resisting foreign aggression, 
defending the motherland, and safeguarding overall social stability and the 
peaceful labor of its people. To build a fortified national defense and strong armed 
forces compatible with national security and development interests is a strategic 
task of China's modernization, and a common cause of the people of all ethnic 
groups”2.  
China`s ultimate intentions are prescribed as a custodian of its national security 
interests, from an anti-hegemonic stance: „The pursuit of a national defense 
policy which is defensive in nature is determined by China's development path, its 
fundamental aims, its foreign policy, and its historical and cultural traditions.  
China unswervingly takes the road of peaceful development, strives to build a 
harmonious socialist society internally, and promotes the building of a harmonious 
world enjoying lasting peace and common prosperity externally.  
China unswervingly advances its reform and opening up as well as socialist 
modernization, making use of the peaceful international environment for its own 
development, which, in return will contribute to world peace.  
                                                     
1Defence White Paper (2002), Ministry of National Defence, People`s Republic of China, 2002. 
2China`s National Defence in 2010 (2011), Ministry of National Defence, People`s Republic of 
China, 2011. 
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China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and promotes 
friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence. China unswervingly maintains its fine cultural traditions 
and its belief in valuing peace above all else, advocating the settlement of disputes 
through peaceful means, prudence on the issue of war, and the strategy of 
“attacking only after being attacked.  
China will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military 
expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy develops”1. The 
macro-role that the Chinese policy- makers envisioned for China is that of a 
peaceful actor. This macro-role can be divided in two subsequent roles: defender 
of national sovereignty and  promoter of anti-hegemonism. 
 
3. Rounding Off the Arguments Presented  
China`s foreign policy is addictive to the peaceful rise rhetoric. The peaceful ascent 
is circumscribed, as we have showed in the arguments presented across this article, 
with the historical delivery, style and arrangement of the Sino-Southeast Asian 
interactions.  
Filling the broadest sense of this discourse, the cultural traditions, still maintained 
and steadily kept in, from the imperial era, have helped forge the rhetorical profile 
of affording a halcyon behavioral mode.  
In Southeast Asia, more than in any other part of the world, China`s Southeast 
Asian presence, characterized discursively by a placid gist, shows numerous areas 
of manifestation. Even if there are incongruities with the manner in which this 
auto-conceived role is actually perceived, it has become a far-too long trialing 
experiment in China`s foreign policy.  
                                                     
1China`s National Defence in 2010 (2011), Ministry of National Defence, People`s Republic of 
China, 2011. 
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